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rppclaw.com
October 23, 2026
•
[ ransomware, finance ]
rppclaw.com was listed as a victim on the leak site of the incransom ransomware group; the attack is estimated to have taken place on 2026-10-23. Sector: Professional Services. Country: United States of America. Website: rppclaw.com. Richardson, Pullen & Buck, P.C. is a law firm headquartered in Fillmore, New York. The firm provides a broad range of legal services to residents of the rural Southern Tier Counties of Western New York, specifically serving clients in Allegany, Wyoming, and Cattaraugus Counties. Its legal practice emphasizes real estate, municipal law, estate planning and probate practice, personal injury, and business law.
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D.L. Steiner, Inc
October 24, 2026
•
[ ransomware, manufacturing, energy ]
D.L. Steiner, Inc was listed as a victim on the leak site of the incransom ransomware group; the attack is estimated to have taken place on 2026-10-24. Sector: Manufacturing. Country: United States of America. Since 1988, D.L. Steiners quality services and responsive customer support have helped us build a long list of loyal clients across a range of disciplines, including manufacturing, warehousing, electrical generation and distribution, and mining.
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dunbarandboardman
October 29, 2026
•
[ ransomware, retail, technology ]
dunbarandboardman was listed as a victim on the leak site of the incransom ransomware group; the attack is estimated to have taken place on 2026-10-29. Sector: Retail & E-Commerce. Country: United Arab Emirates. Dunbar and Boardman, a trusted name and a premier consultancy specializing in lifts, escalators, vertical transportation, and faade access solutions. With decades of expertise, we specialize in delivering innovative and practical solutions for lifts, elevators, escalators, vertical transportation and faade access systems across diverse sectors.We have filesNDAs, client data, design blueprints, payment documentation, and employee data.
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Bcpsystems
October 29, 2026
•
[ ransomware, technology, manufacturing ]
Bcpsystems was listed as a victim on the leak site of the incransom ransomware group; the attack is estimated to have taken place on 2026-10-29. Sector: Technology. Country: United States of America. Southern Californias Full Service Electronics Manufacturing and Repair Solution. Established in 1993 and fully ISO 9001:2015 & AS9100D Certified, we have built a proud reputation for outstanding quality by being on-time, on-budget and for providing unmatched controls and world class service from start to finish. Our solutions can be fully customized to support your long-term business goals and improve your profits.We have filesNDAs, client data, design blueprints, payment documentation, and employee data.
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J.E.T.S. Limited (MultiLink/ACH)
October 21, 2026
•
[ ransomware, finance ]
J.E.T.S. Limited (MultiLink/ACH) was listed as a victim on the leak site of the incransom ransomware group; the attack is estimated to have taken place on 2026-10-21. Sector: Financial Services. Country: Jamaica. J.E.T.S. Limited operator of the MultiLink/ACH payment switch, Kingston, Jamaica
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Somervell County
October 20, 2026
•
[ ransomware, government ]
Somervell County was listed as a victim on the leak site of the incransom ransomware group; the attack is estimated to have taken place on 2026-10-20. Sector: Government & Defense. Country: United States of America. Evidence of the data's existence is attached.
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Gator Works Computing (Smith Law Firm, Beauchamp Edwards Epas, Wise Accounting Tax Service...
October 26, 2026
•
[ ransomware, technology, healthcare ]
Gator Works Computing (Smith Law Firm, Beauchamp Edwards Epas, Wise Accounting Tax Service... was listed as a victim on the leak site of the incransom ransomware group; the attack is estimated to have taken place on 2026-10-26. Sector: Professional Services. Country: United States of America. # Gator Works Computing Inc. Massive Client Data Breach Exposes Thousands of Florida Residents
**Published:**
**Category:** Data Breach / MSP Negligence
---
## A Small-Town IT Company's Failure Puts an Entire Community at Risk
**Gator Works Computing Inc.**, a managed IT services provider based in Chiefland, Florida, has suffered a catastrophic security breach that has exposed the sensitive personal, financial, medical, and legal records of thousands of individuals across the Tri-County area of North Central Florida.
Founded in 1996 and operating from 4 West Park Avenue, Chiefland, FL 32626, Gator Works Computing markets itself as a trusted IT partner offering managed services, network solutions, VoIP, and cybersecurity promising clients their "technology needs to be secure and reliable." That promise has now been broken in the most devastating way possible.
The breach, which compromised the company's backup and server infrastructure, resulted in the complete exfiltration of client data from at least **four local businesses** that entrusted Gator Works with the management of their critical IT systems.
---
## The Scale of the Breach
### Client 1: Beauchamp & Edwards CPAs
**Website:** beauchampedwardscpa.com
**Address:** 105 E Park Ave, Chiefland, FL 32626
Beauchamp & Edwards is one of the region's most prominent CPA firms, providing tax preparation, accounting, and advisory services to the Tri-County area. The breach has exposed:
- **1,805+ individual client folders** organized alphabetically, each containing multi-year tax returns, financial statements, and personal records
- **3,500+ client records** in the firm's full client listing database
- **297 Beneficial Ownership Information (BOI) entities** filed with FinCEN including owner identification documents (driver's licenses, passport numbers, Social Security Numbers) as required by federal law
- **191 individual BOI filings** with full legal names, addresses, and government-issued ID data
- **88 partnership filings** and **165 S-Corporation records** with registered business details
- Multiple sets of **staff login credentials** for email, remote access tools (TeamViewer), and financial portals stored in plaintext within folder names on the server
The exposed data spans the complete financial lives of nearly two thousand families and businesses across Levy, Dixie, and Gilchrist Counties. Tax returns contain Social Security Numbers, bank account information, income details, investment records, and employer identification numbers.
The BOI filings are particularly concerning these federally mandated reports contain the exact type of identification documents most valuable for identity theft: driver's license numbers, passport numbers, and dates of birth for every beneficial owner of registered businesses.
---
### Client 2: Smith Law Firm, LLC
**Website:** smithlawfirmfl.com
**Address:** 2560 N Young Blvd, Chiefland, FL 32626
Smith Law Firm is a well-established general practice law firm with over 70 years of combined legal experience, handling cases across all 67 Florida counties. The firm has secured multi-million dollar settlements for clients, including a $7 million tractor trailer verdict and a $1.75 million nursing home negligence case.
The breach has compromised what is perhaps the most legally sensitive category of data imaginable **attorney-client privileged communications and case files:**
- **316+ legal case files** spanning criminal defense, civil litigation, family law (custody, divorce), estate planning, and personal injury
- **187 personal document folders** belonging to firm attorneys and staff
- **Email credentials for all firm attorneys** including B. Larry Smith, Christine Smith, Shannon, Caleb, Dorys, and service accounts extracted from a scanned password document stored on the server
- **Client Social Security Number lists** maintained for case management
- **IOTA trust account records** attorney trust funds holding client money
- Criminal defense case files containing the most sensitive information imaginable charges, evidence, witness statements, and defense strategies
- Family law records including custody disputes, domestic violence injunctions, and divorce proceedings
The exposure of attorney-client privileged material represents not only a data breach but a potential crisis for every client whose legal matters are now in the hands of unauthorized parties. Under Florida Bar ethics rules, attorneys have a duty to protect client confidences a duty that relied entirely on the IT security provided by Gator Works Computing.
---
### Client 3: Bennitt Patterson Chiropractic
**AKA:** Chiefland Chiropractic Center / Chiefland Chiropractic PLLC
**Location:** Chiefland, FL
Dr. Ben Patterson's chiropractic practice is a healthcare provider subject to HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act) federal regulations. The breach has exposed:
- **Complete QuickBooks financial database** (47+ MB) containing patient billing records, insurance payment details, and payroll information
- **Insurance claim documents** including scans of Aetna health insurance claims from 2025-2026, which reveal patient names, diagnoses, treatment codes, and billing amounts
- **Patient correspondence** and medical office documents including beneficiary notices, privacy officer appointments, and appointment records
- Documents spanning over a decade of chiropractic practice operations
Under HIPAA, healthcare providers and their business associates (including IT companies like Gator Works) face penalties of up to **$1.5 million per violation category** for breaches of protected health information. The HHS Office for Civil Rights maintains a public "Wall of Shame" for all breaches affecting 500+ individuals.
---
### Client 4: Wise Accounting & Tax Services, Inc.
**Owner:** Lowell R. Wise Jr.
**Location:** Chiefland, FL area
Wise Accounting is a bookkeeping and tax preparation firm that manages the financial records for a staggering number of local businesses. The breach has created a cascading chain of exposure:
- **373 QuickBooks company files** representing over **200 unique businesses**
- **15 years of financial data** (2011-2026) including payroll records with employee Social Security Numbers, wages, and tax withholdings
- Monthly accounting records for dozens of businesses simultaneously
- Client businesses include:
- **Healthy Steps Pediatrics PA** a children's medical practice (HIPAA-protected)
- **Michael A. Rascati, OD PA** an optometry practice (HIPAA-protected)
- **Chiefland Chiropractic** overlapping with Client 3 above
- Dozens of construction companies, farms, restaurants, auto body shops, pest control services, and retail businesses
- **Church of God** and other nonprofit organizations
- **Cedar Key Harbour Master, Inc.** and other marine businesses
The ripple effect of this single client's data exposure extends to thousands of employees whose payroll records including Social Security Numbers, addresses, and salary information are now compromised.
---
## Who Is Responsible?
**Gator Works Computing Inc.** was the sole IT provider for all four businesses. As a managed service provider, Gator Works was entrusted with:
- Server management and maintenance
- Backup solutions and data protection
- Network security (firewalls, WiFi, switching)
- Endpoint security and monitoring
- Technology consulting and support
The evidence makes clear that Gator Works Computing failed in its most fundamental responsibility: **keeping client data secure.**
Multiple indicators of poor security practices were discovered:
1. **Credentials stored in plaintext** Login credentials for email, remote access (TeamViewer), and financial portals were stored directly in folder names on managed servers, visible to anyone with file system access
2. **Weak password policies** Multiple accounts across different clients used predictable patterns based on phone numbers and first names
3. **Inadequate data segmentation** All client data was accessible from the same infrastructure with no apparent isolation between clients
4. **Failure to encrypt sensitive data at rest** Tax returns, legal documents, medical records, and financial databases were stored without encryption
5. **No effective intrusion detection** The breach went undetected, allowing complete exfiltration of multi-terabyte datasets
---
## Regulatory Implications
The following federal and state regulations are implicated by this breach:
| Regulation | Applicability | Potential Penalties |
|---|---|---|
| **HIPAA** | Patient records from 3 medical practices | Up to $1.5M per violation category |
| **GLBA (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act)** | CPA and accounting firm financial data | FTC enforcement, civil penalties |
| **Florida Statute 501.171** | All Florida resident PII | $500K+ in penalties, mandatory notification |
| **IRS Circular 230** | Tax preparer data protection | IRS sanctions, practice restrictions |
| **Florida Bar Ethics Rules** | Attorney-client privileged materials | Bar discipline, malpractice liability |
| **FinCEN BOI Regulations** | Beneficial Ownership filings | Federal enforcement |
| **FTC Act 5** | Unfair or deceptive practices | FTC investigation and consent orders |
Under Florida's data breach notification law (501.171), affected individuals must be notified within 30 days of discovery. Given the scope of this breach potentially affecting over **5,000 individuals** the Florida Attorney General's office must also be notified.
---
## The Human Cost
Behind every record in this breach is a real person in a small Florida community:
- **Families** whose complete financial histories income, debts, assets are now exposed
- **Business owners** whose government identification documents were filed with FinCEN and are now in unauthorized hands
- **Criminal defendants** whose defense strategies and private legal communications have been compromised
- **Patients** whose medical conditions, treatments, and insurance information are no longer private
- **Children** whose pediatric medical records were maintained by Healthy Steps Pediatrics
- **Divorcing couples** whose custody disputes and financial declarations are now exposed
- **Employees** of 200+ local businesses whose Social Security Numbers and payroll data have been stolen
In a town of approximately 2,700 residents, this breach effectively compromises the personal data of the **entire community** and the surrounding Tri-County area.
---
## About Gator Works Computing Inc.
| Detail | Information |
|---|---|
| **Legal Name** | Gator Works Computing Inc. |
| **Address** | 4 West Park Ave, Chiefland, FL 32626 |
| **Phone** | 352-493-1006 |
| **Email** | info@gatorworks.com |
| **HR Email** | hr@gatorworks.com |
| **Website** | gatorworks.com |
| **LinkedIn** | linkedin.com/company/gator-works-computing |
| **Founded** | 1996 |
| **Size** | 2-10 employees |
| **Type** | Self-Owned |
| **Services** | Managed IT, VoIP, Network, Cameras, Repair |
| **DNS/Email** | Hosted on Atlantic.net |
| **Registrar** | Web.com |
The company is currently hiring an **IT Support Specialist** perhaps an indication that staffing shortages contributed to the security failures that led to this breach.
---
## Data Available for Download
The following data categories have been obtained and will be made available:
- Complete tax client files (Beauchamp & Edwards)
- BOI filings with owner identification
- Legal case files across all practice areas (Smith Law Firm)
- Email account credentials for law firm attorneys
- Chiropractic patient records and insurance claims
- 373 QuickBooks company databases (Wise Accounting)
- 15 years of payroll records for 200+ businesses
- All staff and service credentials found in plaintext
**Total estimated individuals affected: 5,000-10,000**
**Total businesses affected: 200+**
**Data timespan: 2010-2026**
---
*This post will be updated as analysis of the data continues. Additional clients of Gator Works Computing may be identified.*
-
Stadtwerke Waldbröl GmbH
October 17, 2026
•
[ ransomware, energy ]
Stadtwerke Waldbrl GmbH was listed as a victim on the leak site of the incransom ransomware group; the attack is estimated to have taken place on 2026-10-17. Sector: Energy & Utilities. Country: Germany. # Stadtwerke Waldbrl
## Company Description
Stadtwerke Waldbrl GmbH is a 100% municipally owned utility company that provides public services in the city of Waldbrl (Germany). The company specializes in water supply, wastewater disposal, and street lighting, providing reliable, high-quality service to the public at fair prices.
## Contact Phone Numbers
- Main number: +49 2291 / 9268-0
- Fax: +49 2291 / 9268-30
## Additional Information
- Managing Director: Mirco Kujbida
- Court of Registration: Amtsgericht Siegburg
- Commercial Register Number: HRB 11372/1
- Tax ID Number: 212/5804/0837
- Certification: DVGW TSM (drinking water quality)
### Main Categories:
- [Exchange] Exchange and communication area for internal and external communication
- [Users] Management of user data and user accounts
- [PLANTS] Area for technical and operational data related to the plants
- [000 Storage] Archiving system for general documents and storage
- [Archive] Historical data and archived documents
- [Business] Business data and business transactions
- [Household Connection Data] Information on household connections for water and electricity supply
## Data Storage Statistics
- Total number of files: 189,663
- Total number of folders: 12,926
- Total storage space: 131 GB
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ÖVERUM AGRO
October 14, 2026
•
[ ransomware, manufacturing, leak ]
VERUM AGRO was listed as a victim on the leak site of the incransom ransomware group; the attack is estimated to have taken place on 2026-10-14. Sector: Agriculture and Food Production. Country: Sweden. # Company Analysis of Overum Agro
## General Information
- **Company Name**: Overum Agro
- **Website**: [https://www.overum-agro.se/](https://www.overum-agro.se/)
- **Field of Activity**: Agricultural machinery, agricultural equipment
- **Geographical Location**: Sweden (based in Overum, Sweden)
- **Website Language**: Swedish (primary), partially English
---
## Company Description
### 1. **Mission and Values**
Overum Agro positions itself as an innovative provider of agricultural solutions, specializing in:
- Development and production of modern equipment for the agricultural sector.
- Sustainable agricultural development (focus on environmental friendliness and efficiency).
- Long-term partnerships with customers.
### 2. **Products and Services**
The company offers:
- **Agricultural Equipment**:
- Tillage machines (e.g., cultivators, harrows).
- Seeding systems and seeders.
- Crop protection equipment (sprayers).
- **Services**:
- Technical support and service.
- Personnel training.
- Consulting on equipment implementation.
### 3. **Customers and Markets**
- **Main Customers**: Farmers, agro-cooperatives, and agricultural enterprises in Sweden and Northern Europe.
- **Competitors**: Lokon, Vderstad, Kverneland Group (indirectly, as Overum specializes in niche solutions).
### 4. **Innovation and Technology**
- Use of modern materials and engineering solutions to increase productivity. - Implementation of digital technologies (e.g., equipment monitoring and control systems).
### 5. **Social Responsibility**
- Focus on sustainability (emission reduction, energy efficiency).
- Support for local farms.
---
## Website Analysis
### 1. **Structure and Navigation**
- **Home**: Brief company description, key products, news.
- **Products**: Categorized catalog with technical specifications.
- **About**: History, mission, team.
- **Contacts**: Contact form, address, phone number.
- **News**: Reviews of new products and events.
### 2. **Design and UX**
- **Style**: Minimalistic, professional, with an emphasis on functionality. - **Colors**: Green and gray tones (symbolize nature and reliability).
- **Responsiveness**: Full support for mobile devices.
### 3. **SEO Optimization**
- Keywords: "jordbruksmaskiner" (agricultural machines), "jordbruk" (agriculture), "lantbruk" (farming).
- Meta tags and titles are structured for search engines.
- Blog/news are updated regularly (a good signal for SEO).
### 4. **Content Strategy**
- Technical product descriptions with an emphasis on benefits.
- Videos and photos of equipment in operation.
- Case studies (customer reviews).
---
## SWOT Analysis
| **Strengths** | **Weaknesses** |
|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| High product quality | Limited sales geography |
| Innovative solutions | Limited product range (niche specialization) |
| Strong customer relationships | |
| **Opportunities** | **Threats** |
|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Expansion into new markets (e.g., the Baltics) | Competition from large players |
| Implementation of digital solutions (IoT, AI) | Changing agricultural policy in the EU |
---
## Conclusions
Overum Agro is a Swedish company with a strong focus on innovation and sustainability in agricultural technology. Its strengths include product quality and narrow specialization, which allow it to occupy a leading position in the Northern European market. For further growth, the company should consider expanding its sales geography and implementing digital technologies.
*************************************************
# File Structure Description
## General Information
- **Root Directory**: Contains 45 files and folders.
- **Data Types**: Documents, instructions, reports, lists, tools, and utility files.
---
## File Categories
### 1. **Documents and Reports**
- **`[0-CPM100 filer till Ola]`**: Files related to CPM100 for Ola.
- **`[CPA control document product number]`**: CPA control documents with product numbers.
- **`[Invoice]`**: Invoices.
- **`[Order number]`**: Order numbers.
- **`[WOGA]`**: Possibly internal code or project.
### 2. **Instructions and Standards**
- **`[0-Gravyrmaskin]`**: Documentation for engraving machines.
- **`[0-kortmaskin]`**: Documentation for cardboard cutting machines.
- **`[IFS-instruktioner]`**: Instructions for the IFS (International Featured Standards) standard.
- **`[KVALITET]`**: Quality system documents.
- **`[Overum Knowledge Management - Documents]`**: Knowledge management system documents.
### 3. **Personnel and Departments**
- **`[Daniel H]`**: Files related to Daniel H.
- **`[HR]`**: Human Resources documents.
- **`[HSE]`**: Health, Safety, and Environment documents. - **`[KARIN]`**: Files related to Karin.
- **`[KARIN LOGISTIK]`**: Documents from Karin's logistics department.
- **`[Robert]`**: Files related to Robert.
- **`[Susanne]`**: Files related to Susanna.
- **`[Susanne Planering]`**: Documents from Susanna's planning department.
- **`[Teknik]`**: Technical documents.
- **`[Service and Support]`**: Documents from the service and support department.
- **`[Slitdelsfrpackning]`**: Packaging for spare parts.
- **`[Supply]`**: Documents from the supply department.
- **`[Underhll]`**: Documents on maintenance and repair.
- **`[VERKTYG]`**: Tools and equipment.
- **`[Verktyg och fixturnummer frn 2026-04-17]`**: Tool and fixture numbers from April 17, 2026.
- **`[ldre medarbetare]`**: Documents on old employees.
- **`[verlm. Jarkko_COSV]`**: Transfer of Jarkko's affairs (COSV).
- **`[verlm. Susanne_COSV]`**: Transfer of Susanne's affairs (COSV).
### 4. **Other files**
- **`[1]`**: Possibly internal code or project.
- **`[Covid-19]`**: Documents related to the COVID-19 pandemic.
- **`[Jubileum 2005]`**: Documents related to the 2005 jubilee.
**************************************************
## Contact Information
### **Address**
Overum Agro AB
Box 13
SE-590 93 verum
Sweden
### **Phone**
+46 (0)493 350 00
### **Email**
- **General Inquiries**: info@overum-agro.se
- **Sales**: sales@overum-agro.se
- **Service and Support**: service@overum-agro.se
### **Contact Form**
An online form is available on the website for submitting inquiries (https://www.overum-agro.se/contact/).
---
## Employee Contacts
### **Management**
- **CEO**: Johan Andersson
- **Email**: johan.andersson@overum-agro.se
### **Sales**
- **Mikael Svensson** (Sales Manager)
- **Email**: mikael.svensson@overum-agro.se
- **Phone**: +46 (0)493 350 05
- **Emma Johansson** (Customer Service Manager)
- **Email**: emma.johansson@overum-agro.se
- **Phone**: +46 (0)493 350 10
### **Service and Support**
- **Lars Pettersson** (Head of Service)
- **Email Email**: lars.pettersson@overum-agro.se
- Phone**: +46 (0)493 350 15
- Anna Berg** (Service Specialist)
- Email**: anna.berg@overum-agro.se
- Phone**: +46 (0)493 350 20
### **Logistics Department**
- Karin Lundgren** (Logistics Manager)
- Email**: karin.lundgren@overum-agro.se
- Phone**: +46 (0)493 350 25
### **Purchasing Department**
- Robert Eriksson** (Purchasing Manager)
- Email**: robert.eriksson@overum-agro.se
- **Phone**: +46 (0)493 350 30
### **Quality Department**
- **Susanne Nilsson** (Head of Quality Department)
- **Email**: susanne.nilsson@overum-agro.se
- **Phone**: +46 (0)493 350 35
-
Association «ENSEMBLE»
October 13, 2026
•
[ ransomware, healthcare, finance ]
Association ENSEMBLE was listed as a victim on the leak site of the incransom ransomware group; the attack is estimated to have taken place on 2026-10-13. Sector: Other. Country: France. # Ensemble Boutancourt
Ensemble Boutancourt is a website related to the organization and management of support and assistance structures, including departments, documentation, reception, general resources, accounting, mail, finance, and specialized services. According to the information provided, the site features internal navigation through departments and functional sections, indicating the resources administrative and organizational nature.
## Available Sections and Information
The website features the following sections:
- **Direction / RH** management and human resources
- **Documentation / Rsidants-MAS** documentation and materials regarding residents
- **Admission / Paramdical / SAVS-Direction** admissions, paramedical support, and SAVS management
- **Commun / Patrimoine-Scu / savs-samsah** general resources, safety and property matters, SAVS/SAMSAH
- **Comptabilit / PPI-Budget Direction** accounting, budgeting, and planning
- **Courrier / Resp-Financier** mail and financial responsibility
## Type of Information
Based on its structure, the website may contain:
- administrative documents;
- personnel and management data;
- information on residents/service recipients;
- financial and budgetary materials;
- official correspondence;
- working documents for internal departments.
-
City of Princeton
October 11, 2026
City of Princeton was listed as a victim on the leak site of the incransom ransomware group; the attack is estimated to have taken place on 2026-10-11. Sector: Government & Defense. Country: United States of America. # City of Princeton, Texas Municipal Government
**Date added:** September 2026
**Website:** princetontx.us
**Sector:** Government / Municipal Administration
**Location:** Collin County, Texas, USA (Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex)
**Employees:** ~150+
**Annual Budget:** $3050M
---
## Who They Are
The **City of Princeton** is a rapidly expanding municipality in Collin County, Texas one of the fastest-growing areas in the United States. With an estimated population of 35,00050,000 residents, over **13,750 active utility accounts**, and **12+ major residential subdivisions** under active development, Princeton handles significant volumes of citizen data daily. The city manages police, fire/EMS, a municipal court processing 1,000+ cases annually, public works, water and wastewater utilities, parks, a public library, and development services.
---
## What We Have
**Complete backup of the city's internal file server** over **20 departmental folders** spanning every branch of municipal operations. Structured databases, financial records, email archives totaling nearly 2 GB, full forensic extractions of elected officials' personal devices, court records, and active credentials to city systems.
Below is a summary. This is not everything.
---
### 14,000+ Citizen Records Names, Addresses, Account Numbers, Balances
The city's Utility Billing department maintained detailed records on nearly every resident:
- **13,249 residential addresses** full names, utility account numbers, complete physical addresses, service classification, and account status
- **13,756 sewer service records** overlapping dataset with account-level detail
- **2,540+ new residential accounts** opened between 20242025 across all active subdivisions (Sicily, Monticello, Winchester, Whitewing, Cypress Creek, Forest Park, Princeton Heights, Windmore, Lowry Trails, and others)
- **430 disconnect records** names, addresses, outstanding balances, **partial Social Security Numbers**, collection status, and associated landlord information
- **408 delinquent accounts** names, addresses, and itemized balance aging from current to 120+ days overdue
Every Princeton resident with a utility account is in this dataset. Every address. Every balance. Some with SSN fragments.
---
### Mayor's Phone 299,240 Artifacts, Full Extraction
A **Magnet AXIOM forensic extraction** of Mayor **Eugene Escobar Jr.'s iPhone** was performed by the city's own police department (Sergeant C. Crawford, Badge #2203, April 23, 2026). We have the complete output:
- **299,240 total artifacts** the full digital life of the sitting Mayor
- **12.97 GB of attachments** photos, documents, media
- **Complete SMS and iMessage history** private conversations with Council members, the City Manager, attorneys, outside advisors, and personal contacts
- **Full call log** with timestamps, durations, and contact identifiers
- **File system contents** of the device
What those messages reveal:
- **Open hostility between Mayor Escobar and Council Member Cristina Todd** the Mayor refusing to attend events, demanding all communication go through email, proposing mediation meetings at restaurants. Todd accusing city staff of withholding documents. Escalating confrontations via text.
- **Police Chief Stephens resigning** confirmed via text from Alt. City Manager Jeff Jones: *"Chief Stephens is resigning and going back to The Colony"*
- **Active internal investigation** the city engaged a law firm; attorneys were preparing "redacted versions" of investigation documents; the Mayor pushed back: *"Redacted? Why is it redacted?"*
- **City Manager search** being conducted simultaneously
- **Potential conflict of interest** "Eugene Escobar Jr. & Associates" appears on the city's own official partner/vendor list while Escobar serves as Mayor
Also extracted:
- **Mayor's iPad** 4.56 GB, full portable case with dependencies
- **Director of Development Services (Shailaja "Shai" Roos) phone** 137 text messages and 367 voice call records with carrier-level metadata, including private discussions about salary negotiations (*"$120,000 and flexibility to work from home one day a week"*), hiring decisions, zoning disputes, and coordination with Council members and P&Z commissioners outside official channels
---
### 1,000+ Municipal Court Cases Defendants, Insurance, Driving Records
The Municipal Court handles Class C misdemeanors, traffic violations, and city ordinance cases. We have:
- **Complete offense code and fine schedule** every violation type the city prosecutes, with associated penalties
- **Individual case files** containing defendant full names, insurance card scans, Texas driving records, letters of legal representation, and case dispositions
- **Video evidence** incident footage, altercation recordings (MP4/MOV files) used in court proceedings
- **Citation summaries** with outstanding balances and warrant information
- **Judge RFQ** the city is actively seeking a new Municipal Court Judge (RFQ #26-100022, deadline September 10, 2026)
Anyone who has been cited, ticketed, or charged by the City of Princeton their records are here.
---
### Active Credentials 10 Accounts, Passwords in Plaintext
A Chrome browser password export from a city employee contains **working credentials** for:
- **cityofprincetontx.aws.executime.com** HR/payroll/timekeeping system (password equals username)
- **princeton.biblionix.com** Library management system
- **texas.vdxhost.com / texas.agshareit.com** Inter-library loan platforms (shared generic credentials)
- **application.notaries.com** Notary application portal
- **member.txla.org** Texas Library Association membership
- **login.yahoo.com** Shared institutional email account
Password patterns are predictable: `Word+Year+Symbol` format. The ExecuTime HR system uses **username as password**. These credentials were active at time of extraction.
---
### 1.9 GB of Email Archives Officials, Legal, Investigations
Exchange PST exports from **multiple city employee mailboxes**:
| Archive | Size | Content |
|---------|------|---------|
| State Farm Development all employees | 978 MB | Full development correspondence |
| Eugene Escobar Jr. & Associates | 329 MB | Mayor's associated business communications |
| Cristina Todd & Shai Roos | 306 MB | Council member + Director correspondence |
| Cristina Todd mailbox | 73 MB | Council member's full email |
| Maxine Ellis mailbox | 67 MB | City staff email |
| Business View Magazine | 64 MB | Editorial/media planning |
| Ryan Shiflet mailbox | 4.8 MB | City staff email |
| Additional archives | ~77 MB | General requests, additional staff |
These archives contain correspondence related to **active legal matters**, internal investigations, policy decisions, vendor negotiations, and personnel actions.
---
### Legal Files Active Litigation, 100+ Open Records Requests, Subpoenas
- **Godby vs. City of Princeton** active lawsuit documentation
- **100+ Public Information Requests** (reference numbers W047259 through W051876) filed in 20252026, many related to the Mayor, budget decisions, and internal conflicts
- **Subpoena Duces Tecum** documents
- **Compliance folder** email exports pulled from employee personal devices as part of legal preservation
- **Multiple complaint files** involving elected officials
- **DEIB investigation materials** internal review documents
---
### Complete Internal Phone Directory
Every department, every extension, every direct line including:
- **Non-public police dispatch:** 972-547-5350
- **All department heads** with direct numbers and cell phones
- **Mayor, Council members, City Manager** contact information
- **Vendor and contractor** emergency contacts
- **Utility provider** direct lines
---
### City Infrastructure Engineering, Security, Utilities
- Water and wastewater **master plans** system-wide design documents
- Public works **engineering specifications** lift station designs, drainage systems
- **Generator inventory** for critical facilities
- **Security camera layouts** Parks Department surveillance positioning
- **Budget documents** spanning FY2024 through FY2027
- Contracts, surety bonds, easements, subdivision plats
- Fleet management records, facilities maintenance schedules
---
## The Full Picture
This is not a partial leak. This is **everything** the complete digital footprint of a Texas city government. The personal data of **over 14,000 citizens**. The private text messages from the **Mayor's phone**. Court records for **over a thousand defendants**. **Working passwords** to city systems. **Nearly two gigabytes** of official email including active legal matters. Forensic device extractions that expose a city government in internal crisis a Mayor at war with his own Council, a Police Chief walking out the door, attorneys drafting redacted reports, and salary deals cut over text message.
The citizens of Princeton trusted their city with their names, addresses, Social Security Numbers, and court records. The Mayor trusted his phone with conversations that were never meant to be public. That trust now depends entirely on what happens next.
**Contact deadline: 10 days. After that, full publication begins starting with the citizen database and the Mayor's phone.**
-
polyvista.com
October 9, 2026
•
[ ransomware, technology ]
polyvista.com was listed as a victim on the leak site of the incransom ransomware group; the attack is estimated to have taken place on 2026-10-09. Sector: Technology. Country: United States of America. Website: polyvista.com. PolyVista offers innovative solutions designed to enhance the customer experience by transforming data into actionable insights. Their products, including ChartExpo and TxtViz, enable businesses to visualize data and improve decision-making processes. Targeting industries such as e-commerce, manufacturing, and compliance, PolyVista helps clients identify quality issues, enhance consumer safety, and achieve compliance. With a user-friendly interface, their tools cater to both novice and experienced users, making data analysis accessible to all.
-
American Council of Education
September 30, 2026
•
[ ransomware, leak, education ]
American Council of Education was listed as a victim on the leak site of the incransom ransomware group; the attack is estimated to have taken place on 2026-09-30. Sector: Education. Country: United States of America. # American Council on Education Data Breach Disclosure
**Published:** September 30, 2026
**Data Publication Date: October 7, 2026**
---
> *ACE was given the opportunity to resolve this matter privately. Their leadership engaged in discussions, then chose to walk away without resolution. Five weeks later, they have not notified a single affected individual, institution, or regulator. That decision has consequences.*
---
## About ACE
The [American Council on Education](https://www.acenet.edu) (ACE) is the primary coordinating body for U.S. higher education. Headquartered at **One Dupont Circle NW, Washington, DC 20036**, ACE represents over **1,700 colleges and universities**, manages military credit evaluations for the Department of Defense, administers tens of millions in federal grants, and holds a **DoD Facility Security Clearance** (CAGE Code: 2B710).
ACE's entire network was compromised all four Active Directory domains, Microsoft 365 cloud tenant, 21 SQL Server databases, executive email systems, financial platforms, CRM, source code repository, and physical security systems. **271 GB of data was exfiltrated.**
On **October 7, 2026**, the complete dataset will be made publicly available for download.
---
## Table of Contents
1. [Personal Data](#1-personal-data--700000-individuals)
2. [Financial Records](#2-financial-records--117-billion-18-years)
3. [Military & Defense](#3-military--department-of-defense)
4. [Federal Grants](#4-federal-grants--94-million)
5. [Executive Email](#5-executive-email--349000-files)
6. [Source Code & Credentials](#6-source-code--credentials)
7. [CRM & Membership Intelligence](#7-crm--membership-intelligence)
8. [ACE's Choice](#8-aces-choice)
9. [Data Availability October 7](#9-data-availability--october-7-2026)
10. [File Tree](#10-file-tree--271-gb)
11. [Sample Data](#11-sample-data)
---
## 1. Personal Data 700,000+ Individuals
| Data Type | Records | Details |
|:----------|--------:|:--------|
| **Social Security Numbers** | **1,831** | Stored in **plaintext** full name, home address, phone, cumulative payment history. Highest-paid individual received **$1,960,263** from ACE |
| **Tax Identification Numbers** | **4,698** | Individual (SSN-based) and corporate EINs from vendor 1099-NEC filings |
| **Participant records** | **426,000** | Dates of birth, addresses, phone numbers, education history |
| **CRM contacts** | **264,674** | University presidents, provosts, deans, federal officials names, emails, titles, institutional affiliations, congressional district mapping |
| **Email addresses** | **700,000+** | Across CRM, marketing, participant, and staff databases |
| **Phone numbers** | **441,094** | CRM and participant databases |
| **Physical addresses** | **621,230** | CRM and participant databases |
| **Building visitor records** | **329,739** | Names, employers, phone numbers, dates of birth, driver's license data. **87 individuals on security watchlist** with detailed notes |
| **Active Directory accounts** | **2,590** | 2,398 passwords recovered in cleartext. All 11 Domain Admin accounts shared the same password |
---
## 2. Financial Records $1.17 Billion, 18 Years
| Record Type | Amount | Transactions |
|:------------|-------:|-------------:|
| **Check register** | **$1,172,540,297** | 40,432 |
| **Accounts receivable** | **$497,049,586** | 188,878 |
| **Accounts payable** | **$392,951,456** | 76,499 |
| **General Ledger entries** | | 1,027,547 |
**Also obtained:**
- **Bank of America** account numbers, routing numbers, wire transfer records. Master ZBA balance: **$3,659,703**. Routing: `054001204`. ACH Company ID: `1530196573`
- **Investment portfolio exceeding $500 million** GED Testing joint venture ($148M), iShares S&P 500 ($65.7M), Cash Depository ($62.9M), Vanguard ($23.5M), Goldman Sachs ($12.7M)
- **Wire transfers** up to **$8.25 million** per transaction (annual March membership collection pattern)
- **Complete payroll records** all current and former employees, salaries, benefits, tax withholdings
- **Board-level monthly financials** FY20032022 (568,512 rows)
---
## 3. Military & Department of Defense
| Data | Details |
|:-----|:--------|
| **Military Evaluation Database** | 23,755 course evaluations, 3,429 military occupational specialties, 1,849 installations **70 years of data (1951present)** |
| **Sensitive courses** | **2,472 records** intelligence, nuclear, cyber, special operations, weapons systems, submarine warfare |
| **Foreign installations** | Germany (Vilseck, Grafenwhr, Munich), Japan (Yokosuka, Atsugi), Korea, Italy (Naples), Spain (Rota), Panama, Philippines (Subic Bay) |
| **DoD payments** | **$40.9 million** (DFAS) |
| **Navy contract** | N0018915CZ075 CPARS performance evaluations obtained |
| **Facility Security Clearance** | Signed DD Form 441, DD Form 254, SF-328, **KMP personnel list**, FSO contract, DCSA correspondence, cure notices |
---
## 4. Federal Grants $94+ Million
| Source | Amount | Records |
|:-------|-------:|:--------|
| **USAID** | **$53.6M** | 402 international partnerships, HED program database (11.5M rows) |
| **DFAS (DoD)** | **$40.9M** | Military evaluation contracts |
| **Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation** | **$10.9M** | Education grants |
| **Lumina Foundation** | **$8.6M** | Education grants |
| **NIH** | | 2,464 grant document files |
---
## 5. Executive Email 349,000+ Files
Complete email archives of ACE's senior leadership, spanning **20052024**:
| Mailbox | Owner | Role | Files | Size |
|:--------|:------|:-----|------:|-----:|
| `yomim` | Moses Yomi | **CFO** | 135,838 | 21.5 GB |
| `broadm` | Molly Corbett Broad | **President / CEO** | 81,248 | 13 GB |
| `freemank` | Kara Freeman | **VP / CIO** | 55,240 | 10 GB |
| `riskindj` | Jonathan Riskind | **VP Communications** | 34,847 | 4.9 GB |
| `hartle` | Terry Hartle | **SVP Government Relations** | 21,732 | 3.2 GB |
| `fansmithj` | Jon Fansmith | **Dir. Government Relations** | 16,490 | 1 GB |
| | | **Total** | **349,145** | **31 GB** |
### Contents include:
- **Board of Directors** meeting minutes, resolutions, audit committee records, voting records
- **Attorney-client privileged** legal memoranda GEDTS LLC negotiations, Penn State crisis, compliance opinions
- **Executive compensation** $832,493 hidden deferred compensation (SVP Hartle), CEO tax-free Georgetown residence arrangement, $275,000 Spencer Stuart executive search
- **CEO employment agreements** Broad (20082017), Mitchell (2017present), Ward (20012007). Full terms: salary, bonus, 457(f) deferred comp, residence, relocation
- **Banking** 1,313 Bank of America files from CFO mailbox: reconciliations, wire transfers, check registers, audit workpapers
- **HR records** termination notices, separation agreements, PIPs, restructuring plans
- **Lobbying** Congressional engagement strategy, quarterly lobbying reports, political position papers
- **Military** Navy CPARS contract evaluations, DCAA submissions, security clearance correspondence
---
## 6. Source Code & Credentials
| Item | Details |
|:-----|:--------|
| **TFS repository** | 3 projects, 15,000+ versioned source files |
| **Hardcoded credentials** | 15 unique production, staging, and dev environments |
| **Encryption keys** | Triple DES key + IV for CRM data processing |
| **Azure AD** | Client secrets, API keys, ASP.NET machine keys |
| **O365 Global Admin** | Full Microsoft 365 tenant control |
### Credentials (sample):
```
Domain Admin (all 11 accounts, 4 domains): @c3@dm1n
Secondary (546 accounts): @ce12345
O365 Global Admin: Tnpi*3233
Mimecast Super Admin: up@Tusaw2442
Duo MFA Admin: up@Tusaw0518
Check Point Firewall: up@Tusaw
vCenter root: @c3@dm1n
CRM Production: pwd@3m@1!
SQL Server: BroadPointDidIt!
MySQL root: root
Universal IT service account: 1Ts3rvice$
```
> *11 Domain Admins. Same password. Four domains. This is the organization that accredits America's universities.*
---
## 7. CRM & Membership Intelligence
| Data | Volume |
|:-----|-------:|
| Active member institutions | 24,882 |
| University presidents & senior leaders | 3,564 |
| Congressional district mapping | Complete every institution mapped |
| Membership dues records | 222,180 |
| Marketing email tracking | 13.9 million sent records |
| "Deleted" contacts (still in DB) | 18,222 (6,751 VIPs) |
---
## 8. ACE's Choice
ACE leadership was contacted in **late August 2026**. They were shown proof of access. They understood the scope. They engaged in discussions.
**Then they stopped responding.**
In five weeks, ACE has not:
- Notified a single affected individual
- Notified any of their 1,700 member institutions
- Filed a report with the U.S. Department of Education
- Reported the FCL compromise to DCSA
- Notified the IRS about 1,831 exposed SSNs
- Filed breach reports with any state Attorney General
- Made any public statement of any kind
**1,831 people** have exposed Social Security Numbers and don't know it.
**426,000 people** have compromised personal records and don't know it.
**264,674 higher education leaders** have their data in unauthorized hands and don't know it.
**Military security clearance files** are compromised and DoD doesn't know it.
ACE decided that protecting its reputation was more important than protecting the people it serves.
**We offered a private resolution. They chose public consequences.**
---
## 9. Data Availability October 7, 2026
On **October 7, 2026**, the following will be published and available for download:
| Dataset | Volume |
|:--------|-------:|
| 21 database backups (financial, CRM, military, PII, security) | 89 GB |
| 30 PST email archives | 31 GB |
| Complete file share exports | 55 GB |
| Organized financial, military, legal documents | 34 GB |
| Source code repository | 11 GB |
| Active Directory dumps (4 domains) | |
| Azure AD tenant data (5,411 accounts) | |
| **Total** | **~271 GB** |
### Regulatory Filings
We are simultaneously filing formal reports with:
| Agency | Basis |
|:-------|:------|
| **U.S. Department of Education, OIG** | FERPA 426,000 education records |
| **DCSA** | Facility Security Clearance compromise |
| **IRS Criminal Investigation** | 1,831 SSNs + 4,698 TINs in plaintext |
| **USAID OIG** | $53.6M grant records compromised |
| **Federal Trade Commission** | 700,000+ PII records |
| **All 50 State AGs + DC** | Breach notification law violations |
| **Senate HELP Committee** | Higher education oversight |
| **House Education Committee** | Higher education oversight |
| **Armed Services Committees** | Military data compromise |
### For Affected Individuals
If your data was held by ACE particularly if you are among the **1,831 individuals whose SSNs were stored in plaintext** you are advised to immediately:
1. Place a **fraud alert** or **credit freeze** with Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion
2. Monitor financial accounts for unauthorized activity
3. File a complaint with the FTC at [ftc.gov/complaint](https://www.ftc.gov/complaint)
4. Contact ACE and demand an explanation: **(202) 939-9300**
---
## 10. File Tree 271 GB
```
ace-tier1/ 55 GB Executive user profiles & email
broadm/ 13 GB President/CEO WAVES, family docs, medical, board, 5 PSTs
yomim/ 21.5 GB CFO 10 PSTs, Bank of America, deferred comp, IRS 990, payroll
HARTLET/ 3.2 GB SVP Gov Relations 6 PSTs, $832K deferred comp, FCL docs
freemank/ 10 GB VP/CIO 4 PSTs, IT operations, vendor contracts
riskindj/ 4.9 GB VP Communications archive PST, VP assessments
t-fansmithj/ 1 GB Dir Gov Relations lobbying, political papers
mcdonoughp/ 131 MB General Counsel legal, employment law
blooms/ 32.9 GB VP Gov Relations 14.3 GB PST, Congressional, lobbying, tax
ace-databases/ 27 GB 21 production databases
CREDIT 2.8 GB 426K participants, SSNs
MILITARY 141 MB 23,755 evaluations, 70 years
CRM 2.0 GB 264,674 contacts
TFS 790 MB source code, 15K files
EasyLobby9 478 MB 330K visitors, watchlist
CDBPROD 11 GB accreditation database
HED_OLD 8.5 GB USAID programs
[13 more databases]
files_ACE/ 34 GB Organized documents
WAVES, IRS 990, Security Clearance, Military/CPARS
Lobbying, NIH grants, Bank of America, Deferred Comp
Political papers, VP Assessments, 30 PST archives
CEO medical records, board evaluations
identity/ AD dumps + cloud
ace.nche.edu 2,590 hashes, 2,398 cleartext
ACESUB/ACEDMZ/ACEWEB full NTDS dumps
Azure AD 5,411 users, 440 apps, 7 domains
vCenter root access, 8 ESXi hosts
```
---
---
> *The American Council on Education coordinates higher education policy for the United States. It evaluates military training. It lobbies Congress. It manages $94 million in assets.*
>
> *An organization entrusted with this responsibility to its members, to students, to service members, to federal agencies chose to hide a catastrophic breach rather than tell the people affected.*
>
> *Every day of silence is a day that 1,831 people with exposed Social Security Numbers cannot protect themselves.*
>
> *ACE chose silence. This notification exists because someone had to choose otherwise.*
-
avoltaworld.com
October 8, 2026
•
[ ransomware, retail ]
avoltaworld.com was listed as a victim on the leak site of the incransom ransomware group; the attack is estimated to have taken place on 2026-10-08. Sector: Other. Country: Switzerland. Website: avoltaworld.com. Avolta is a global retail company specializing in convenience stores and travel retail operations. Founded in 2020 and headquartered in Switzerland, the company maintains a significant international presence across Europe, North America, Asia-Pacific, Middle East, and South America. Avolta operates extensive retail networks in airports, transportation hubs, and commercial centers, offering consumers convenient shopping experiences with a diverse range of products and services. The company leverages mobile applications and digital solutions to enhance customer engagement while maintaining physical retail locations worldwide.
-
2F1JV
October 7, 2026
•
[ ransomware, manufacturing ]
2F1JV was listed as a victim on the leak site of the incransom ransomware group; the attack is estimated to have taken place on 2026-10-07. Country: United Arab Emirates. 2F1JV is a nonprofit joint venture between VINCI Construction Grands Projets and Archirodon. They built the main depot, Al Faya, for Etihad Rail in Abu Dhabi under contract D0201, valued at approximately $230310 million.
-
PT Forisa Nusapersada
October 12, 2026
•
[ ransomware, leak, manufacturing ]
PT Forisa Nusapersada was listed as a victim on the leak site of the incransom ransomware group; the attack is estimated to have taken place on 2026-10-12. Sector: Other. Country: Indonesia. # PT Forisa Nusapersada
**Industry:** Food & Beverage Manufacturing (FMCG)
**Headquarters:** Jakarta, Indonesia
**Manufacturing:** Cikupa (Tangerang) & Ungaran (Central Java)
**Revenue:** IDR 5.15 Trillion / **$350M+ USD** (2024, confirmed from internal financial database)
**Employees:** 6,494 active (32,447 historical)
**Ownership:** Private
**Founded:** 1995
**Website:** forisa.co.id
**Auditor:** PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC)
---
## Summary
PT Forisa Nusapersada is one of Indonesia's largest powder beverage and food manufacturers, operating since 1995. The company is the owner of **Pop Ice** the number one powdered drink brand in Indonesia as well as **Nutrijell**, **Teh Sisri**, **Anget Sari**, and over 20 other consumer brands distributed across Indonesia and exported to Malaysia, Philippines, Australia, Hong Kong, Saudi Arabia, South America, and multiple African countries.
A complete breach of the company's IT infrastructure has resulted in the exfiltration of **771,199 files** totaling over **2.8 TB** of data spanning **6 production servers**, including the company's SAP HANA ERP production database, SQL Server data warehouse, HR application server, tax filing server, and file server. **Four SQL Server databases have been fully restored and analyzed**, revealing the complete financial, operational, HR, and distribution data of the company.
Despite attempts to establish contact, the company has not responded.
---
## Scope of Compromised Data
**Total volume:** 771,199 files
**Data size:** 2.8 TB
**Coverage:** 6 internal servers, full SAP ERP, 4 SQL databases restored
### Infrastructure Compromised
| Server | Type | Data |
|--------|------|------|
| **FNPDATACIKUPA02** | NAS / File Server (Synology) | 209,634 files 26 departments including Accounting, HR, IT, QA, R&D, Production |
| **FNPDATACKP01** | Backup Staging Server | 559,662 files Tier1/Tier2 backups + Wasabi S3 cloud staging |
| **FNPDBPRD01** | SAP HANA Production Database | 584 GB full backup + restore kit with credentials |
| **FNPDBWH01** | SQL Server Data Warehouse | 192 GB 7 databases (Financial, HR, Lab, Production, Reseller) |
| **FNPHRAPP01** | HR Application Server (Laravel) | ~310 GB / 2.59M files employee portal, candidates, contracts |
| **TAX-SERVER** | E-Faktur Tax Filing Server | 1,885 files + digital signing certificates (.p12) |
### Active Directory Domain
- **Domain:** FORISA (forisa.co.id)
- **Domain Controller:** FNPDC01
- **Endpoints enumerated:** 268 devices (from Kaspersky Security Center report)
### Data Categories
| Category | Description |
|---|---|
| **Financial** | 430,727 sales invoices (2017-2026), IDR 5.15T annual revenue, 1,778 customers/distributors with credit limits, AR balances, sell-out data (101M+ records) |
| **HR / Employee PII** | 37,175 employees (NIK/national ID, address, phone, DOB, email), 21,015 salary records with base pay amounts, 7,347 employment contracts, 15,911 BPJS social security records |
| **Credentials** | **620,229 MD5 password hashes** from HR system, SAP HANA production credentials (SAPABAP1, SYSTEM, DDIC), 252+ plaintext employee passwords, Permata Bank payroll account passwords |
| **Candidates** | **612,478 job applicants** with NIK, email, phone, current and expected salary |
| **Distribution** | 7,504 resellers with PII (NIK, tax ID, address, email), 22,365 sales orders, 20,243 invoices |
| **Production** | 19,454 products, 177 suppliers/vendors with contact details and tax IDs |
| **Tax** | Digital signing certificates (.p12) for E-Faktur tax filing, Derby tax databases |
| **IT Audit** | PricewaterhouseCoopers ITGC/Cyber audit reports (2024-2025), SAP user access reviews with password hashes, sudoers configurations, server specifications |
| **Cloud** | Wasabi S3 access credentials (ap-southeast-1), rclone staging scripts |
---
## Key Financial Figures
| Year | Invoices | Revenue (IDR) | Revenue (USD) |
|------|----------|---------------|---------------|
| 2020 | 40,279 | IDR 3.95 Trillion | $274M |
| 2021 | 43,647 | IDR 4.11 Trillion | $285M |
| 2022 | 52,122 | IDR 4.64 Trillion | $324M |
| 2023 | 49,768 | IDR 4.88 Trillion | $341M |
| **2024** | **56,148** | **IDR 5.15 Trillion** | **$360M** |
| **2025** | **52,133** | **IDR 5.06 Trillion** | **$354M** |
| 2026 (Jan-Sep) | 38,301 | IDR 3.81 Trillion | $266M |
*Source: T_SLS_INV table from FNDB financial database, verified invoices only*
Revenue has grown consistently from IDR 2.4T in 2017 to over IDR 5T in 2024-2025, representing a compound annual growth rate of approximately 10%.
**Monthly payroll (September 2026):** IDR 3.42 Billion (~$216,000) for Cikupa factory alone via Permata Bank.
---
## Personal Data Exposed
| Category | Count | Details |
|----------|-------|---------|
| **Employee PII** | **37,175** | Full name, NIK (national ID), address, phone, DOB, position, department |
| **Job Candidates** | **612,478** | Full name, NIK, email, phone, salary history |
| **Credential Pairs** | **620,229** | Email + MD5 password hash |
| **Plaintext Passwords** | **252+** | Employee payslip passwords stored in Excel files |
| **BPJS Records** | **15,911** | Social security numbers, dependents' names |
| **Bank Account Data** | **1,600+** | Permata Bank payroll account numbers + passwords |
| **Reseller PII** | **7,504** | NIK, tax ID, address, email, phone |
| **Customer/Distributor** | **1,778** | Company details, credit limits, tax IDs |
| **Total unique individuals** | **~650,000+** | |
---
## Key Findings
- **SAP HANA production credentials exposed in plaintext** database administrator accounts (SAPABAP1, SYSTEM, DDIC) found in a restore kit stored alongside the 584 GB database backup, enabling full access to the company's core ERP system
- **620,229 MD5 password hashes** the company's HR system stores user passwords using the obsolete and trivially crackable MD5 algorithm with no salting
- **Bank payroll passwords follow a predictable pattern** Permata Bank payroll account passwords use the format `Permata{MM}{YYYY}` (e.g., Permata062026), sent via unencrypted email and stored in .MSG files on the file server
- **Employee passwords stored in plaintext Excel files** monthly files titled "Password slip gaji" contain employee IDs mapped to cleartext passwords, many of which are simply dates of birth
- **PricewaterhouseCoopers (Big 4) auditor** despite engaging a world-class auditor for IT general controls assessment, the company failed to implement basic security measures
- **No cyber insurance detected** review of all available documentation found no evidence of a standalone cyber insurance policy
- **Tax digital certificates compromised** .p12 signing certificates for the Indonesian E-Faktur system were obtained, potentially enabling fraudulent tax filings
- **Cloud storage credentials exposed** Wasabi S3 bucket access keys found in rclone scripts, providing access to the company's cloud data staging environment
---
## Consequences of Non-Cooperation
### Regulatory Exposure (Indonesia)
- **UU PDP (Law No. 27/2022 Personal Data Protection):** Effective October 2024. Penalties up to **2% of annual revenue** (approximately **$7M USD** for Forisa) for failure to protect personal data. The breach affects 650,000+ individuals.
- **OJK Financial Regulations:** Exposure of banking data (payroll accounts, bank passwords) triggers financial regulatory notification requirements.
- **BPJS Data Protection:** Compromise of 15,911 social security records may trigger BPJS regulatory inquiry.
### Business Impact
- **Competitor intelligence:** Complete pricing, customer, and distribution data exposure enables competitors (Mayora, Wings Group, Indofood) to target Forisa's 1,778 distributors and replicate pricing strategy.
- **Brand damage:** Pop Ice and Nutrijell are household brands in Indonesia. A public data breach affecting 650,000+ people will generate significant media coverage.
- **SAP system integrity:** With exposed ERP credentials, the company cannot trust the integrity of its financial data until a complete security audit and credential rotation is performed.
-
ELITDATA SE (Advokatfirman Kurt Lundberg HB,Artwood AB,Mantum Group)
October 5, 2026
•
[ ransomware, leak, technology ]
ELITDATA SE (Advokatfirman Kurt Lundberg HB,Artwood AB,Mantum Group) was listed as a victim on the leak site of the incransom ransomware group; the attack is estimated to have taken place on 2026-10-05. Sector: Professional Services. Country: Sweden. # Elitdata i Varberg AB Complete Infrastructure Breach
**Published:** [DATE]
---
Elitdata i Varberg AB (org.nr 556355-2586) is a Swedish IT Managed Service Provider based in Varberg, Halland. Founded in 1997, they provide IT infrastructure, server management, and cloud services to businesses in western Sweden.
On [DATE], we obtained a complete copy of Elitdata's operational data **670 gigabytes** containing **587,000 files** spanning 29 years of operations. The breach exposes not only Elitdata's own internal data, but the complete datasets of their clients, including a law firm, a furniture company, and a logistics conglomerate.
Elitdata stores all client data centrally on shared infrastructure with no meaningful segmentation between clients. A single compromise cascades through their entire client base.
---
## The Scope
| Dataset | Type | Size | Files |
|---|---|---|---|
| Elitdata i Varberg AB | IT Provider internal ops + 198 client folders | 80 GB | 55,000 |
| Advokatfirman Kurt Lundberg HB | Swedish law firm | 122 GB | 204,000 |
| Artwood AB | Furniture & design company | 205 GB | 327,000 |
| Mantum Group | Logistics & construction conglomerate | 263 GB | 129 |
| **Total** | | **670 GB** | **587,000** |
---
## Elitdata The IT Provider
**Address:** Vstra Vallgatan 7, 432 45 Varberg, Sweden
**Website:** elitdata.se | **Phone:** 0340-86860
Elitdata is owned by Mattias Rdlund and Stefan Qvarford. Their website markets them as a "mature and courageous IT company" that has been operating since 1997.
From their infrastructure we obtained:
**198 Client Organizations** complete IT documentation for each, including:
- VPN access configurations (.tgb) to connect directly to client networks
- Firewall configurations (full rulesets)
- Bitlocker encryption keys
- Server documentation and network diagrams
- Remote Desktop (RDP) connection files for 50+ client sites
**Wildcard SSL Private Keys:**
- `*.elitdata.se` certificate with private key (.pem, .pfx), valid 2025-2026
- `*.mantum.se` certificate with private key (.key, .pem, .pfx), valid 2026
**XCA Certificate Database** the complete certificate authority used to manage all SSL certificates.
**Veeam Backup Configurations** five backup configuration exports from September 2026 (2.3 GB total), containing the full backup infrastructure layout.
**Microsoft 365 Partner Access** Elitdata operates as a Microsoft Indirect Reseller, with delegated admin access to client M365 tenants.
**Employee Data** vacation/absence records 2009-2025, driving logs, personal folders for all staff.
**NIS2 Compliance Documents & Incident Response Plan** ironically, their own security documentation is part of the breach.
---
## Client 1: Advokatfirman Kurt Lundberg HB Law Firm
**122 GB | 204,000 files | Org.nr 559218-5713**
This is the most sensitive dataset. Advokatfirman Kurt Lundberg is a law firm in Varberg specializing in criminal defense, bankruptcy proceedings, civil disputes, and family law.
The exposed data includes the **complete case archive** of the firm:
### Criminal Defense Cases 26,871 files
The criminal defense archive contains named defendants with their:
- Full police investigation reports (FUP frunderskningsprotokoll)
- Attorney defense notes and strategy documents
- Personal identity documents and passport copies
- Court case references (Varbergs Tingsrtt, Gteborgs Tingsrtt)
- Phone call logs between attorney and client
- Evidence files including USB phone extractions
Case types include aggravated tax fraud (grovt skattebrott), civil registration fraud (folkbokfringsbrott), assault, drug offenses, and multiple migration/asylum cases.
### Bankruptcy Proceedings 110,973 files
Complete legal files for 20+ company bankruptcies, including:
- Creditor lists and debt inventories
- Asset valuations and estate inventories
- Creditsafe credit reports
- Court filings and distribution plans
- Wage guarantee (lnegaranti) documents for affected employees
### Civil Disputes & Family Law 20,807 files
- Civil lawsuits and insurance claims
- Inheritance distributions (arvskiften)
- Guardianship cases (God Man)
- Custody matters
- Estate administration (ddsbon)
### Attorney Communications
- Email archives (PST) totaling approximately 15 GB
- Internal correspondence between lawyers
- Client communication records
### Financial Records
- Complete SIE accounting files 2020-2026
- Payroll records (Visma Ln 300) for 2021-2024, including a separate file for "Advokatfirman Anton Karlsson AB"
- Balance reports and general ledger entries
**Identified attorneys and staff:** Anton Karlsson (primary case attorney), Sofia (disputes/family law), Henrik, Anders, Krister, Peter, Tina, Ing-Mari, Ulla, Kurt Lundberg (founding partner).
---
## Client 2: Artwood AB Furniture & Design
**205 GB | 327,000 files**
Artwood AB is a Swedish furniture and home dcor company with international sales across Scandinavia, Europe, and New Zealand.
The exposed data includes their **complete business operation:**
- **Purchasing** (55,684 files) supplier contracts, purchase orders, pricing structures with factories
- **Sales** (15,058 files) complete customer lists, pricing, order history
- **Marketing** (33,969 files) product catalogs, campaigns, promotional materials
- **Complete ERP backup** (54,916 files) Pyramid ERP system with full database
- **3D product renders** (19,407 files) entire 2026 product line in 3D
- **Employee data** phone list of all employees, email lists, personnel records, anniversary tracking
- **EU Deforestation Regulation** (EUDR) compliance documentation
**From Elitdata's client folder for Artwood:**
- VPN configuration file (Artwood.tgb)
- Complete firewall configuration (startup-config.conf)
- SSL certificate for mail.artwood.se with private key
- GDPR Data Processing Agreement (Personuppgiftsbitrdesavtal)
- Incident report templates
A competitor with access to this data would gain complete visibility into Artwood's supplier network, pricing strategy, customer base, and product pipeline.
---
## Client 3: Mantum Group Logistics & Construction Conglomerate
**263 GB | 129 files (all SQL databases)**
Mantum is a Swedish conglomerate operating across logistics, construction, and transportation through multiple subsidiaries. The exposed dataset consists entirely of **live Microsoft SQL Server production database files** the most concentrated form of business-critical data possible.
### Databases:
| Database | Size | Contents |
|---|---|---|
| BC140.mdf | 103 GB | **Microsoft Business Central PRODUCTION** complete ERP |
| RamosMantumProd.mdf | 28 GB | Production management system |
| Flow_Mantum (6 instances) | 82 GB | Manufacturing/logistics operations |
| Hogia_HR_Foundation | 2.7 GB | **HR database employee records, contracts, personnummer** |
| Hogia_PBM (7 databases) | 1.7 GB | **Payroll & personnel management** |
| Hogia_Travel | 72 MB | Travel/expense management |
| Opter + Opter_Special | 8.2 GB | Transport/logistics management |
| Per-company accounting | ~600 MB | 10 subsidiaries, 7 years of data |
### Subsidiary companies exposed:
Mantum Entreprenad AB, Mantum Entreprenad i Sverige AB, Mantum Holding AB, Mantum Logistics, Mantum Special AB, Hyltebruks Transport AB, Veddige keriaktiebolag, KC Holding, V Service AB, VAAB Service AB.
### Plaintext Credentials
From Elitdata's client documentation for Mantum, a file titled "Anvndare.txt" contains plaintext credentials:
- **Microsoft 365 Global Admin:** admin@mantum.se
- WiFi network passwords for all Mantum SSIDs
- Aruba switch and access point admin credentials
- Application credentials for RAMOS production system
- Individual user credentials
These databases contain every financial transaction, employee record, salary payment, customer invoice, supplier payment, inventory movement, and logistics operation for the entire Mantum corporate group spanning 2018 through 2025.
---
## Why This Matters
### 1. Supply Chain Cascade
One IT provider. 198 client organizations. All exposed through a single point of failure. Elitdata held the keys to every client's kingdom VPN access, firewall rules, encryption keys, server documentation and stored it all together.
### 2. Attorney-Client Privilege Destroyed
The law firm data represents one of the most protected categories under Swedish and EU law. Criminal defense files, police reports, and personal client communications are now exposed because the IT provider they trusted failed to protect them.
### 3. GDPR Nuclear Scenario
Elitdata serves as data processor (personuppgiftsbitrde) for all 198 clients. This breach triggers notification obligations cascading through every affected organization. The Swedish Authority for Privacy Protection (IMY) will need to assess GDPR violations not just for Elitdata, but potentially for each client that entrusted their data.
The GDPR Data Processing Agreements we found in the breach signed between Elitdata and their clients now serve as evidence of what data protection obligations were agreed upon and subsequently breached.
### 4. Active, Current Data
The most recent files are dated September 2026. Veeam backup configurations from September 17-21, 2026. VPN configurations updated August 2026. SIE accounting files for fiscal year 2025-2026. This is not historical data this is their live operational environment.
---
## Data Available
The complete dataset (670 GB) is available for download and includes:
- Internal IT infrastructure documentation for 198 Swedish organizations
- Law firm complete case archive (criminal defense, bankruptcy, disputes, family law)
- Furniture company complete business data (ERP, purchasing, sales, HR)
- Logistics conglomerate SQL production databases (ERP, HR, payroll, accounting)
- SSL wildcard certificates with private keys
- VPN and firewall configurations for client networks
- Microsoft 365 delegated admin access documentation
- 29 years of operational records
---
*Contact us through our secure channel for any inquiries.*
-
ZIRNET LLC (mmplumbingny.com alpha1usa.com askconstruction.com mmplumbingny.com tristate-s...
October 8, 2026
ZIRNET LLC (mmplumbingny.com alpha1usa.com askconstruction.com mmplumbingny.com tristate-s... was listed as a victim on the leak site of the incransom ransomware group; the attack is estimated to have taken place on 2026-10-08. Sector: Other. Country: United States of America. # ZIRNET LLC Managed Service Provider FULL BREACH
**Published:** October 2026
**Sector:** Information Technology / Managed Services (MSP)
**Location:** Port Washington, New York, USA
**Website:** zirnet.com
---
## Summary
ZIRNET LLC is a Managed Service Provider (MSP) based in Long Island, New York, providing IT management, cloud services, VoIP, and network infrastructure to over 20 small and mid-size businesses across New York, New Jersey, and Florida.
We have obtained **complete access** to ZIRNET's internal servers, including **all client data they manage**. This represents a catastrophic MSP supply-chain breach affecting **13+ organizations** and hundreds of individuals.
**Total data: 2,260,963 files across ZIRNET and 12 client server backups.**
---
## Affected Organizations
ZIRNET's negligent security practices have resulted in the exposure of the following companies' complete IT environments:
| # | Company | Industry | Location | Files |
|---|---------|----------|----------|-------|
| 1 | **AlphaOne USA LLC** | Marine & Construction Supply | Miami, FL / Long Island City, NY | 148,118 |
| 2 | **ASK Construction Corp** | General Contracting | New York, NY | 92,247 |
| 3 | **Dynotec Contracting Inc (DCI)** | Construction | Brooklyn, NY | 180,858 |
| 4 | **Industrial Solutions NY (ISNY)** | Industrial Supply & Services | New York, NY | 262,702 |
| 5 | **King Contracting Corp** | General Contracting | New York, NY | 67,997 |
| 6 | **Lanmark General Contracting** | General Contracting | New York, NY | 251,861 |
| 7 | **M&M Plumbing & Heating NY** | Plumbing & HVAC | New York, NY | 122,626 |
| 8 | **Pibbs Industries** | Salon Equipment Manufacturing | Hauppauge, NY | 214,495 |
| 9 | **Rising Sun General Contracting** | General Contracting | New York, NY | 340,559 |
| 10 | **Seabreeze General Contracting** | General Contracting | New York, NY | 53,665 |
| 11 | **The USA Roofer / USA GC** | Roofing & Contracting | NY / FL | 469,495 |
| 12 | **Tristate Safety Corp** | Safety Products & Services | New York, NY | 53,597 |
**Additional organizations with exposed credentials and data:**
- Skylatus Property Capital LLC (Real Estate)
- ClearScope (myclearscope.com)
- Midtown Operating Corp
- Credit and Debt Management Institute (Bolivar, TN)
- La Perla Construction & Design
- LIVOTIS Old World Market
- St. Albans Congregational Church (Queens, NY)
- Creative Mobile Technologies (CMT)
- North Side Transmission
- NY Flooring Inc
- Metropolitan Association of the NY Conference
---
## What Was Obtained
### 1. ZIRNET Internal Data (2,743 files)
- **QuickBooks databases** Zirnet.QBW (163 MB) and 2025.QBW (155 MB) complete financial records
- **Bank statements** TD Bank, American Express, Bank of America 36 PDF statements covering 2024-2026
- **Email archive** 3.27 GB of PST files (Outlook) containing all business correspondence
- **IRS documents** W-9, estimated tax payments, certified copies
- **Client proposals and contracts** service agreements with all clients
### 2. Complete Credential Database (100+ accounts)
For each managed client, ZIRNET stored passwords in **cleartext** text files. We obtained:
- **King Contracting:** 30+ Active Directory and M365 accounts with plaintext passwords
- **Industrial Solutions (ISNY):** 39 email accounts with passwords
- **ClearScope:** 8 Microsoft 365 accounts with passwords
- **Skylatus Property Capital:** Full IT documentation export including 33 accounts, firewall admin, DNS admin, VPN pre-shared keys, Barracuda admin, Azure credentials
- **St. Albans Church:** 18 email accounts + Azure tenant secret key
- **LIVOTIS:** 3 accounts + VoIP portal access
- **AlphaOne USA:** Banking passwords (AMEX, Chase, CitiBusiness)
### 3. Hidden Backdoor Account on ALL Client Machines
ZIRNET created a **hidden administrator account** on every managed workstation and server:
```
Username: NetworkAccess
Password: [REDACTED]
```
This account is hidden from the Windows login screen using registry manipulation and has full local administrator privileges. This represents a **serious security malpractice** a single credential compromise gives access to every machine ZIRNET manages.
### 4. Credit Card Numbers (with CVV)
Three client credit cards stored in plaintext files, including full card numbers, expiration dates, and CVV codes.
### 5. Personal Identifiable Information (PII)
- **Social Security Numbers** Employee SSN scans from Dynotec, ASK Construction
- **Birth certificates** AlphaOne USA (family members)
- **W-2 forms / Tax returns** Multiple years (2021-2025) for AlphaOne USA employees
- **Employee I-9 forms and drivers licenses** AlphaOne USA
- **Medical records** Owner's colonoscopy, CT scan, and family medical documents
- **Credit reports** Owner's personal credit history (2005-2015)
- **Payroll data** Complete W-2/W-3 packages for multiple years across organizations
### 6. Network Infrastructure
- **Juniper SRX firewall configuration** (Midtown Operating) root passwords, VPN pre-shared keys, full NAT rules, internal network topology
- **Meraki MX67 firewall credentials** (Skylatus) admin password, WiFi PSKs, external IP
- **N-Central RMM admin credentials** ZIRNET's remote management console controlling all endpoints
- **Azure tenant secrets** tenant IDs, client secrets for M365 migrations
### 7. Full Server Backups (12 clients)
Complete drive images from 12 client servers including:
- All user documents, profiles, and application data
- Accounting records (invoices, payroll, tax documents)
- Private folders with personal files
- Browser profiles with saved credentials
- Construction project files, contracts, permits
- HR files, employee records, compliance documents
---
## Evidence
**See attached screenshots:**
1. `01_clients_list.png` Full client listing with file counts
2. `02_credentials.png` Sample of extracted credentials (partially redacted)
3. `03_financial.png` ZIRNET financial data and bank accounts
4. `04_pii_sensitive.png` PII and sensitive document inventory
5. `05_infrastructure.png` Network backdoors and firewall configurations
---
## Impact Assessment
This breach affects:
- **13+ organizations** across New York, New Jersey, Florida, and Tennessee
- **500+ individuals** (employees, contractors, clients of affected companies)
- **Multiple regulatory frameworks:** NY SHIELD Act, FTC Safeguards Rule, PCI DSS (credit card data), HIPAA (medical records), IRS Pub 4557 (tax return data)
ZIRNET's security practices represent gross negligence:
1. **Storing all client passwords in plaintext text files**
2. **Using a single hidden backdoor account across all clients**
3. **No encryption on sensitive data storage**
4. **Storing credit card numbers with CVV in plain text**
5. **Mixing personal medical/financial records with business data**
---
## Contact
ZIRNET LLC has **7 days** to make contact before the full unredacted dataset is published.
Countdown: **7 DAYS**
After the deadline:
- All credentials will be published unredacted
- All PII including SSNs will be published
- All financial records will be published
- Each affected company will be notified individually
- Data will be made available for free download
**ZIRNET:** You know how to reach us. The clock is ticking.
---
*This post will be updated as more data is analyzed. Additional client data may be published as proof of access.*
-
La Filipina Uy Gongco
October 7, 2026
La Filipina Uy Gongco was listed as a victim on the leak site of the incransom ransomware group; the attack is estimated to have taken place on 2026-10-07. Sector: Agriculture and Food Production. Country: Philippines. # La Filipina Uy Gongco Corporation (LFUGGOC) Philippines
**Published:** [DATE]
**Data Volume:** 278,594 files
---
## Company Overview
**La Filipina Uy Gongco Group of Companies (LFUGGOC)** is a major Philippine conglomerate operating across multiple industries including food manufacturing, flour milling, animal feed production, sugar processing, livestock farming, port operations, logistics, and real estate.
**Website:** foodgroup.ph
**Headquarters:** Taguig City (BGC), Metro Manila, Philippines
**Employees:** 1,500+
**Annual Revenue:** Estimated PHP 15-20 billion ($270-360M USD)
**Auditor:** SGV & Co. (Ernst & Young Philippines)
**ERP:** SAP S/4HANA
The group operates 17+ legal entities across the Philippines with nationwide operations spanning Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao regions, including 6+ port terminals, flour mills, feed mills, sugar centrals, farms, retail stores, and distribution networks.
---
## Group Entities
| Segment | Companies |
|---|---|
| **Logistics** | Amigo Logistics Corp (ALC), Amadi ALC Services (AASI), Amadi MGT Terminals (AMTI), Mariveles Grain Corp (MGC) |
| **Flour & Pasta** | Philippine Foremost Milling Corp (PFMC), PLILI, MT Philippine Container (MTPCI) |
| **Feeds & Livestock** | LFUG Manufacturing (LFMI), Farms Division, Progreso Retail Stores (PRSI) |
| **Sugar** | CSCI, CAFC, RAFC, Plantation Division |
| **Commodities** | Advanced Agrisolutions Philippines Corp (AAPC), Gentle Earth |
| **Holdings** | CDH Holdings, STARCI/PGIC, Hok Heng/HHH Trading |
| **Real Estate** | LFUG Realty |
---
## Data Exfiltrated
Complete contents of the production file server (FILESHARED01) containing 278,594 files spanning 2018-2026, including:
### Financial Data
- **Consolidated Financial Statements** for the entire group (FY2022 through July 2026)
- **Annual Financial Statements** (AFS) for all business units
- **Budget files** for 2022-2027 including forward projections
- **SGV (Ernst & Young) external audit workpapers** (2022-2025)
- **Bank statements** and reconciliation files (BPI, BDO, Metrobank)
- **Loan documents** including PHP 300M+ BPI promissory notes and amortization schedules
- **Quarterly Income Tax Returns** and all BIR filings
### Employee Data (PII)
- **Complete payroll summaries** for all months of 2025 (24 files, ~13MB each)
- **Employee Alphalist** (JAN-DEC 2025) all employee TIN numbers and annual income
- **Employee contact details** names, phone numbers, email addresses, positions
- **13th Month Pay summaries**
- **Leave summaries** and tax refund data
- **SSS, HDMF (Pag-IBIG), and PhilHealth** contribution records
### Organizational Data
- **30+ organizational charts** for all business units (dated March 2025)
- **Job descriptions** with career paths for all positions
- **KPI documents**
- **Headcount reports** (2026)
### Customer & Vendor Data
- **Customer contact database** (26MB) including major Philippine food brands:
- Jollibee Foods Corporation
- Goldilocks Bakeshop Inc
- Shakey's Pizza Commerce Inc
- The French Baker Inc
- Pan De Manila
- North Park Noodle House
- Vikings Group
- Monde Nissin Corporation
- Del Monte Philippines
- **100+ flour bakery client files** across the Philippines
- **30+ notarized vendor contracts**
### Legal & Compliance
- Correspondence and billing from **5 law firms** (MVGS Law, SAM Law, MOST Law, Rojas & Uy, Tillman & Marquez)
- **Litigation files**
- **SEC filings** and corporate governance documents
- **BIR validated tax returns** (2022-2025)
- **Business permits** (Taguig, Davao, Iloilo, Ingore)
- **Insurance policies** and asset registers
### Operations
- **Import/export documentation** and customs records
- **Vessel operations** data and shipping schedules
- **SAP S/4HANA** data exports, journal entries, and master data
- **Marketing materials** for brands: Iron Claw, Canis Prime, IC+, Progreso
- **IT infrastructure** data including database connection files
---
## Regulatory Implications
This data is subject to the **Philippine Data Privacy Act of 2012 (Republic Act No. 10173)**, which requires:
- **Mandatory breach notification** to the National Privacy Commission (NPC) within 72 hours
- **Notification to affected data subjects** (1,500+ employees and thousands of customers)
- Penalties of up to **PHP 5,000,000** and **imprisonment of 3-6 years** for violations
The company has **5 business days** to respond before data publication begins.
---
## Proof of Data
See attached screenshots showing:
1. Complete file server directory structure
2. Employee payroll files with dates and sizes
3. Group consolidated financial statements
4. HR organizational charts for all business units
5. Customer contact database and email addresses
6. Banking documents and tax filings
-
Nandan Terry Pvt
October 2, 2026
•
[ ransomware, manufacturing, financial ]
Nandan Terry Pvt was listed as a victim on the leak site of the incransom ransomware group; the attack is estimated to have taken place on 2026-10-02. Country: India. # NANDAN TERRY LTD DATA BREACH ANNOUNCEMENT
**Industry:** Textile Manufacturing (Terry Towels, Bathrobes)
**HQ:** Dholka, Ahmedabad, Gujarat, India
**Group:** Chiripal Group
**Website:** nandanterry.com
**Revenue:** ~$23M USD (194 Crore)
**Employees:** 500+
---
## WHAT WE HAVE
Nandan Terry Limited's entire corporate infrastructure has been compromised. We have exfiltrated **200GB+** of data from their internal file servers including 68 workstation backups and all department shared drives.
---
### CREDENTIALS & ACCESS (46+ accounts)
Login credentials for **every shipping and logistics portal** they use including their supply chain accounts with:
- **H&M Supplier Portal** (supplierportal.hm.com)
- **Marks & Spencer** Trading Grid & EDI
- **Walmart** cargo systems
- **Puma** shipping & PO management
- **ALDI** production & contracts
- **LIDL**, **TJX/Marshalls**, **Ross Stores**, **BJ's Wholesale**, **Big Lots**, **QVC**, **Metro**, **XXX Lutz**
- **DHL**, **Kuehne+Nagel**, **GEODIS**, **Yusen Logistics**, **Expeditors**
All usernames, passwords, portal URLs. Many still active.
---
### COMPLETE FINANCIAL RECORDS
- **Profit & Loss** statements monthly, FY 2024-2026
- **Balance Sheet** FY 2024-25 (audited, 47 pages)
- **Consolidated P&L** with revenue breakdown (Export vs Domestic)
- **EBITDA, Net Profit, Working Capital** calculations
- Revenue: **194 Crore** ($23M), Net Profit: **9 Crore** ($1.07M)
- Full cost structure: raw materials, salary, power, logistics
---
### BANKING & LOAN DATA
Complete banking relationships with **7 major Indian banks**:
| Bank | Facility |
|------|---------|
| **Punjab National Bank (PNB)** | CC 70Cr + TL 95Cr |
| **State Bank of India (SBI)** | TL 47Cr |
| **Bank of Baroda (BOB)** | TL 47Cr |
| **Canara Bank** | TL 47Cr |
| **Central Bank of India (CBI)** | TL 70Cr |
| **Union Bank (UBI)** | TL 47Cr |
| **Bank of Maharashtra + Bandhan Bank** | CC facilities |
**Total loan exposure: 433+ Crore ($51.5M)**
All account numbers, IFSC codes, bank RM contacts (names, phones, emails), repayment schedules, interest calculations included.
**PNB E-Banking beneficiary details** 73 pages of payment beneficiaries with account numbers.
---
### CIBIL CREDIT REPORTS & LEGAL ISSUES
**Extremely sensitive** credit bureau data:
- **CIBIL Commercial Credit Report** 69 pages, full credit history
- **DPD (Days Past Due) reports** from Canara Bank (31 days) and SBI (29 days) **evidence of late loan payments**
- **CIBIL irregularity complaints** to PNB
- **Legal suits against company and directors** documented in internal files
- **NCLT (National Company Law Tribunal)** withdrawal orders
- Director **Braijmohan Chiripal** CIBIL irregularity for housing loan 4.75 Crore
- **CRILC (Central Repository)** reporting disputes with Bank of Baroda, Central Bank of India, SBI
This data reveals the company's **true financial health** not the version they show to their buyers.
---
### EMPLOYEE DATA (500+ workers & staff)
- **Complete salary sheets** every employee, every month (NTPL Staff, NTPL Workers, SPG Staff, SPG Workers)
- **Worker increment proposals** with full PII: Name, Father's Name, Department, Designation, Date of Joining, Salary
- **PF (Provident Fund)** and **ESI** data
- **SAP payroll upload files** with individual amounts
- **KPI performance data** individual worker performance metrics
---
### CLIENT & SUPPLY CHAIN DATA
**62+ global buyers** in customer master including:
ALDI, H&M, Walmart, Marks & Spencer, Puma, TJX (Marshalls/TK Maxx), BJ's Wholesale, Ross Stores, Big Lots, QVC, Metro, XXX Lutz, Falabella, LIDL, Meijer, Bealls, Liberty, Hemtex/Kesko, Vineyard Vines, Cencosud, DD's Discount
**Client-specific data includes:**
- Purchase Orders with pricing
- Product specifications (GSM, size, design files)
- H&M Master Order Dashboards (2023-2026)
- Puma packing instructions & shipment data
- ALDI contract correspondence
- Production schedules per buyer
- Cost sheets and margin calculations
**This data is devastating for their buyer relationships.** Major retailers like H&M and Walmart require strict data security compliance from suppliers. This breach proves Nandan Terry cannot protect their supply chain data.
---
### CORPORATE & LEGAL DOCUMENTS
- **KYC package:** CIN, IEC (Import Export Code), GST Registration, Export House Certificate
- **Board Resolutions** (conversion from Pvt to Public)
- **Director list** with education and experience
- **Insurance policies** (8 active plant, machinery, solar, marine)
- **Settlement agreements** (Uday Buildcon)
- **Tax Audit Reports** (FY 2019-2025)
- **Secretarial Audit Report** 2024
- **CredAvenue borrower profile** and shareholding patterns
- **DSRA release letters** from 4 banks
---
### DATA VOLUME
| Category | Volume |
|----------|--------|
| Workstation backups | 68 machines |
| Financial records | Monthly P&L, BS, NCA (2+ years) |
| Salary data | ALL employees, monthly |
| Banking data | 7 banks, full account details |
| Client data | 62+ global buyers |
| Credentials | 46+ portal logins |
| Legal/CIBIL | Credit reports, court cases |
| Insurance | 8 active policies |
| Total estimated | **200GB+** |
---
## TIMELINE
**Announcement published.** Nandan Terry Limited has been contacted.
**4 DAYS** deadline to begin negotiations. If no contact is made, this page will be updated with additional proof samples and the countdown to full publication begins.
**+10 DAYS** full data publication. If no agreement is reached within 10 days after the announcement deadline, the following actions will be taken:
1. **Full financial data** published (P&L, Balance Sheet, loan schedules, CIBIL reports)
2. **CIBIL credit reports and DPD irregularities** sent directly to all 7 banking partners PNB, SBI, BOB, Canara, CBI, UBI, Bank of Maharashtra
3. **H&M, Walmart, Puma, ALDI, Marks & Spencer** notified of their supplier's data security failure and supply chain data exposure
4. **46+ portal credentials** published active shipping and logistics accounts compromised
5. **Employee PII** released salary data, PF numbers, personal details of 500+ workers
6. **Complete data dump** published on clearnet and Tor free download for anyone
**Total time to act: 14 days from today.**
The clock is ticking.
---
*Data verified. Screenshots below are samples only. Full dataset available for verification upon contact.*
---
## PROOF DATA SAMPLES
*Screenshots from exfiltrated data:*















